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 1. Introduction 
 
International trade theory is dominated by two major paradigms. One paradigm belongs to the 
neo-classical world with constant returns to scale in production (CRS) and perfectly competitive 
product markets (PC). The other paradigm rests on the assumption of increasing returns to scale 
(IRS) and, in its most prominent formulation, monopolistically competitive markets (MC). While 
other important models exist which combine features of both paradigms, much of the theoretical 
and empirical debate has concentrated on these two benchmark cases. 
 
To distinguish between paradigms is of more than academic interest. Trade policies, market 
integration, migration, and other economic changes may have very different positive and welfare 
consequences depending on the underlying paradigm. It is therefore worthwhile to look for a 
way of distinguishing the two paradigms in the data, and to quantify their respective importance 
in shaping industrial specialisation patterns. This is the purpose of our study. 
 
In the theoretical part, we develop a discriminating criterion suitable for empirical estimation. 
The criterion relies on the assumption that demand is home biased. It posits that the home bias 
influences international specialisation in sectors that are characterised by increasing returns and 
monopolistic competition (IRS-MC), while such bias is inconsequential for sectors characterised 
by constant returns and perfect competition (CRS-PC). We test this hypothesis in 18 industries, 
based on data for the six major EU economies for 1970-85. Our results suggest that five 
industries, accounting for about a quarter of industrial output, can be associated with the IRS-
MC paradigm. 
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The paper is structured as follows. In Section II we briefly review the relevant literature. Section 
III sets out our theoretical model and derives the discriminatory hypothesis. We operationalise 
this test empirically in Section IV. Section V concludes. 
 
 
2. Related Literature 
 
Numerous studies have directly or indirectly attempted to gauge the relative explanatory power 
of the two main  paradigms in trade theory. 
 
A first group of studies focused on intra-industry trade as evidence of the importance of the IRS-
MC paradigm (see Greenaway and Milner, 1986; and, for a critical appraisal, Leamer and 
Levinsohn, 1995). Since intra-industry trade was generally associated with IRS-MC models, the 
observed large and increasing shares of intra-industry trade were interpreted as evidence of the 
growing relevance of non-neoclassical trade models. This evidence became less persuasive when 
some studies, like Falvey and Kierzkowski (1987) and Davis (1995), demonstrated that intra-
industry trade could also be generated in suitably amended versions of the CRS-PC framework. 
 
A second approach was to enlist the excellent empirical performance of the gravity equation in 
support of the IRS-MC paradigm, since the gravity equation has a straightforward theoretical 
counterpart in the IRS-MC model (Helpman, 1987). This view was challenged by studies that 
showed that the gravity equation could also arise in a variety of other models (Davis and 
Weinstein, 2001a; Deardorff, 1998; Evenett and Keller, 2001; Feenstra, Markusen and Rose, 
2001; Haveman and Hummels, 1997). Furthermore, it was found that the gravity equation is an 
excellent predictor of trade volumes among non-OECD economies, a piece of evidence that is 
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prima facie at odds with the assumptions of the IRS-MC paradigm (Hummels and Levinsohn, 
1995). 
 
A third approach was to derive a testable discriminating hypothesis from the models that could 
serve to distinguish among theoretical paradigms through rigorous statistical inference. Work 
along this line started with Davis and Weinstein (1999, 2001b). They developed a separation 
criterion based on the feature of IRS-MC models that demand idiosyncrasies are reflected in the 
pattern of specialisation more than one for one, thus giving rise to a magnification effect (pointed 
out originally in Krugman, 1980). The magnification effect does not appear in a CRS-PC model. 
This feature can serve as the basis for empirical investigation. Sectors that exhibit the 
magnification effect are associated with the IRS-MC paradigm, while sectors that do not exhibit 
the magnification effect are associated with CRS-PC. Davis and Weinstein have estimated the 
magnification effect empirically in data for Japanese regions (1999) and for OECD countries 
(2001b), which allowed them to attribute industrial sectors to one of the two paradigms. This 
work has stimulated several further developments. Feenstra, Markusen and Rose (2001) found 
that the magnification effect may be generated also in CRS models with reciprocal dumping. 
Instead of the magnification effect they used a discriminating criterion according to which, in a 
gravity equation, the income elasticity of exports should be higher for differentiated goods than 
for homogeneous commodities. Head and Ries (2001) and Head, Mayer and Ries (2001) also 
showed that the magnification effect can arise in settings that do not necessarily conform with 
the IRS-MC paradigm. It has furthermore been found that the magnification effect can be 
sensitive to the modelling of trade costs (Davis, 1998). Head and Ries (2001) recognised this 
sensitivity to trade costs as a useful feature. They found that in CRS sectors the size of the 
magnification effect increases with trade costs whilst in IRS sectors it decreases with trade costs, 
and they used this difference as a discriminating criterion. 
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Our study follows this third approach in extracting a discriminating criterion from the theory to 
distinguish between the main trade models. We make use of the widely documented reality that 
goods from different countries are ipso facto considered imperfect substitutes (the Armington 
assumption), and that buyers are for a variety of reasons biased in favour of either home- or 
foreign-produced goods.1 In such a model, a different type of home-market effect emerges, one 
that arises from the relative magnitude of home bias in expenditure. Our theoretical result is as 
follows. In an IRS-MC setting, relatively strong home bias in a country’s aggregate expenditure 
on a good will make the country relatively specialised in the production of that good; whereas in 
a CRS-PC framework, relative home biases have no impact on the location of production. This 
result forms the basis for our empirical separation criterion. 
 
Our model hinges on the existence of home-biased demand. We argue that this is a sensible 
claim, given the strong empirical evidence in its support. For example, Winters (1984) argued 
that, while demand for imports is not completely separable from demand for domestic goods, 
substitution elasticities between home and foreign goods are nevertheless finite. Davis and 
Weinstein (2001a) and Trefler (1995) found that by allowing for home-biased demand the 
predictive power of the HOV model could be improved very significantly. Head and Mayer 
(2000) identified home bias in expenditure as one of the most potent sources of market 
fragmentation in Europe. Helliwell (1996, 1997), McCallum (1995) and Wei (1996) found that 
trade volumes among regions within countries are generally a multiple of trade volumes among 
                                                 
1
 Feenstra et al. (2001) and Head and Ries (2001) have used the Armington assumption in a similar context. Note 
that we parametrise the home bias in the utility function instead of defining it in terms of the income elasticity of 
imports, as in, e.g., Anderson and Marcouiller (2000). 
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different countries even after controlling for geographical distance and other barriers. The 
assumption of home bias therefore seems to rest on solid empirical grounds. 
 
Finally, our discriminating criterion remains valid even if trade costs are zero. This is an 
attractive feature, considering how difficult it is to quantify trade costs empirically. 
 
 
3. Theory: Derivation of a Discriminating Criterion 
 
A model suitable for our analysis needs to accommodate both the CRS-PC and the IRS-MC 
paradigms. For this purpose, we use a framework close to that of Helpman and Krugman (1985, 
part III).  
 
The world is composed of two countries indexed by i (i=1,2) and two homogeneous factors of 
production indexed by V (V=L,K). Each country is endowed with a fixed and exogenous quantity 
Li and Ki of the factors. L and K are used to produce three commodities indexed by S (S =Y, X 
and Z).2 
 
3.1 Technologies and Factor Markets 
It is assumed that commodities Y and Z are produced by use of a CRS technology and traded in 
perfectly competitive markets without transport costs.3 Good X is assumed to be subject to an 
                                                 
2
 As will become clear below, the presence of trade costs results in the loss of one degree of freedom. To assure 
factor price equalisation we therefore use a three-goods-two-factors framework. 
3
 The discriminating criterion that we develop does not hinge on this assumption; it is also valid if we assume 
positive trade costs in the CRS-PC sector. See Appendix 1. 
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IRS technology and to trade costs. These trade costs are of the conventional “iceberg” type, 
where for each unit shipped only a fraction   [0,1] arrives at its destination. The average and 
marginal cost function associated with a CRS sector is cS(w,r), where w and r are the rewards to 
L and K respectively. Production of X entails a fixed cost f(w,r) and a constant marginal cost 
m(w,r). It is assumed that technologies are identical across countries. In order to make factor 
intensities independent of plant scale, it is assumed that the functions m(w,r) and f(w,r) use 
factors in the same relative proportion. Thus, factor proportions depend only on relative factor 
prices. It is also assumed that there are no factor intensity reversals. The average cost function in 
the X sector is cX(w,r,x) = m(w,r)+f(w,r)/x, where x is output. The number of varieties of X 
produced in the world, denoted by N, and the number of varieties produced in country i, denoted 
by ni, are determined endogenously. The industry-level demand functions for L and K obtain 
from the cost functions through Shephard’s lemma and are denoted by lS(w,r) and kS(w,r).  
 
The efficiency conditions and factor-market clearing conditions are: 
 rwcp SS , ,       S= Y, Z    (1a) 
 rwmpX ,)/11(   ,         (1b) 
 xrwcp XX ,, ,          (2) 
      iiZiXiY LZrwlxnrwlYrwl  ,,,   i = 1,2     (3a) 
      iiZiXiY KZrwkxnrwkYrwk  ,,,   i = 1,2     (3b) 
where  is the elasticity of substitution among varieties of X>1). Equations (1a) and (1b) state 
the usual conditions that marginal revenue equals marginal cost in all sectors and countries. 
Equation (2) states the zero-profit condition in sector X in all countries. Equations (3a) and (3b) 
state the market-clearing conditions for factors in all countries. These equations describe the 
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supply side of the model. Free trade assures commodity price equalisation for goods Y and Z. 
The f.o.b. price of X, pX, is the same across countries and the c.i.f. price is simply /Xp .  
 
3.2 Demand 
Households’ preferences feature love for variety, represented by the traditional nested CES-
Cobb-Douglas utility function. We extend the basic model by assuming that household demand 
is home biased. For simplicity, we model the home bias parametrically at the Cobb-Douglas 
level of the utility function, and represent it by the parameter hi[0,1]. This is a common way of 
parametrising the home bias (see, e.g. Miyagiwa, 1991; Trionfetti, 2001), but other structures are 
conceivable. One alternative representation would be through a parameter that is inserted inside 
the CES aggregate, as in Head and Ries (2001). In Appendix 1 we show that the salient results 
also hold if the home bias is modelled in this alternative form. 
 
When hi=0, the household is not home biased. As hi increases the household becomes 
increasingly home biased, and when hi=1 the household purchases only domestically produced 
commodities. Thus, the representative utility function for the consumer in country i is as follows: 
      ZiZiZiZiYiYiYiYiXiXiXiXi h
i
hh
i
hh
i
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i ZZYYXXU
  111 , with 1S Si , 
and with CES sub-utility 
   
 







	





 
1/
/1/1
21 nk
k
nk
k ccX . 
Denoting with ESi the aggregate expenditure of households of country i on commodity S, we 
have ESi = SiIi , where Ii is aggregate income of households in country i (households have 
claims on capital). Two-stage utility maximisation and aggregation over individuals yields the 
aggregate expenditure of households of country i on each domestic variety of the commodity X. 
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The ratio i SiSi EE /  is country i’s share of world demand for good S. This ratio will serve as the 
basis for the calculation of magnification effects. 
 
3.3 Equilibrium in Product Markets 
The equilibrium conditions in the product market require that demand equals supply for each 
commodity and each variety. The market-clearing conditions are: 
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 2121 YYpEE YYY           (6) 
 
where 1  , and PXi is the usual CES price index Equation (4) states the equilibrium condition 
for the varieties of IRS good produced in country 1, expression (5) states the equilibrium 
condition for the varieties produced in country 2, and expression (6) states the equilibrium 
condition in the market for CRS good Y. According to Walras’ law, the equilibrium condition for 
the other CRS good Z is redundant. The model so far is standard except for the home bias. The 
system (1)-(6) is composed of eleven independent equations and twelve unknowns (pX, pY, pZ, x, 
n1, n2, Y1, Y2, Z1, Z2, w, r). Taking pZ as the numéraire, the system is perfectly determined. 
 
Note that for analytical convenience we have built a tree-by-two model instead of the more usual 
two-by-two structure. This allows us to work within the factor-price equalisation set.4 
                                                 
4
 A two-by-two model would guarantee full dimensionality of the factor-price-equalisation set in the absence of 
trade costs (eight independent equations and nine unknowns). The presence of trade costs segments the market for 
the differentiated commodity and, therefore, requires two equations for that market. Thus, in the presence of trade 
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3.4 A Discriminating Criterion 
There is a difference between the two CRS-PC sectors and the IRS-MC sector that can be 
immediately found by inspection of equations (4)-(6). The difference is that the parameter 
representing the home bias cancels out of equation (6), while it does not cancel out in equations 
(4) and (5). Hence, the home bias does not affect international specialisation in the CRS-PC 
sectors but it affects international specialisation in the IRS-MC sectors. This is the essence of our 
discriminating criterion. In Appendix 1 we show that this criterion remains valid even if we 
assumed trade costs in the homogeneous goods. We associate sectors with the IRS-MC paradigm 
if the home bias is significant in explaining international specialisation in the sector in question. 
Conversely, if the home bias is not significant, we associate the sector with CRS-PC. 
 
It is useful at this point to rewrite equations (4)-(5) in terms of the ratios 21 / nn  and 
21 / XX EE .  This gives: 
         
          011111
11111
11
2
212
2
112
2
2
3
2


hhhhh
hhhhh


    (7) 
It is well known that the roots of a third degree polynomial, especially when there are so many 
parametric coefficients, are unwieldy expressions. Fortunately, we can glean the fundamental 
features of the model by simple inspection of (7), without having to use the explicit solutions. To 
examine the relevant issues, we consider an exogenous idiosyncratic preference shock 
21 XX ddd    that generates the idiosyncratic expenditure shock 21 XX dEdEd  .  
                                                                                                                                                             
costs, it is necessary that there is one good more than there are factors in order to have full dimensionality of the 
factor price equalisation set. While working within the factor-price equalisation set is convenient, the results also 
hold outside it. 
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1. The magnification effect when expenditure is unbiased. If demand is unbiased in both 
countries (i.e., if h1=h2=0) then the left-hand side of (7) reduces to a first-degree polynomial 
whose solution is:      1 . This is the benchmark case. It has the property that 
1/  dd , i.e. it gives rise to a magnification effect. Since the magnification effect is a 
feature of IRS-MC sectors and not of CRS-PC sectors, it has been employed as a 
discriminating criterion. 
2. The magnification effect when expenditure is home biased. If demand is home biased, the 
derivative  dd /  is not necessarily larger than one for the IRS-MC sector (see Appendix 1). 
That implies that the magnification effect may fail to constitute a discrimination criterion. 
However, it is possible in this framework to derive an alternative discriminating criterion.  
3. The discriminating criterion when expenditure is home biased. It is straightforward to show 
that 0/ 021  dhdhdhdhd  for any parameter value. Consider a symmetric change dh1=-
dh2>0. As a consequence of the change, the term on the right-hand side of (4) increases by 
     0/ 2121112112   XX EnnEnnnn  .  
Since the left-hand side of (4) is constant, the increase in the right-hand side requires an 
increase in n1 in order to satisfy (4). The same holds, mutatis mutandis, for (5), and for any 
values of parameters and for any associated solution of the system. The explicit solutions for 
most configurations are extremely complex; but, as a useful example, the case of identical 
countries can be solved in a manageable way. Setting 1  and h1=h2=h, then solving for   
and differentiating around the solution we have:  
     04114/ 2021  hdhd dhdhdh  , 
which confirms a positive response of production shares to idiosyncrasies in the degree of 
home bias. 
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4. Robustness to zero trade costs. The test based on home-biased demand gives a 
discriminating criterion that is valid even in the absence of trade costs. To see this it suffices 
to set 1  in equation (7). This yields the unique solution  21 / hh  . In this extreme 
case, the home bias fully determines the pattern of specialisation. Note that, if neither 
country is home biased (h1=h2=0), and there are no trade costs, the solution is undetermined 
(0/0) and the derivative is zero in all paradigms. The independence of the discriminating 
criterion from trade costs is a welcome feature. This is not because we think trade costs are 
unimportant in reality, but because it makes the discriminating criterion more robust. 
 
We can use these findings to devise a discriminating criterion based on home biased demand. 
Differentiating (7) around any of its solutions with respect to an idiosyncratic change 
21 XX dEdEd   and to a change 21 dhdhdh   gives: 
 
dhcdcd 21   ,          (8) 
 
where the coefficients c1 and c2 are the partial derivatives. The interpretations of parameters c1 
and c2 are summarised in Table 1. 
 
Based on the fact that home-biased demand matters only for IRS-MC sectors, we can derive the 
following discriminating criterion. Sector S is associated with IRS-MC if the estimated c2 is 
larger than zero, and with CRS-PC if the estimated c2 equals zero. That is:  
 if c2 > 0 for sector S, then S is associated with IRC-MC, and 
 if c2 = 0 for sector S, then S is associated with CRS-PC. 
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This discriminating criterion and its empirical implementation are the focus of this paper. In 
addition, our model implies that idiosyncratic demand does not affect international specialisation 
if trade costs are zero. Accordingly, an estimated value of c1 larger than zero reveals the 
importance of trade costs.  
 
 
4. Empirical Implementation 
 
In operationalising our discriminating criterion, we proceed in two stages. First, we estimate 
home biases across industries and countries. Those bias estimates can then be used as an 
ingredient to the estimation of our testing equation (8). 
 
4.1 Estimating Home Bias 
We estimated home separately for each country-industry pair, using an augmented form of the 
standard gravity equation. Thanks to the general compatibility of this approach with the major 
theoretical paradigms, using of the gravity equation at the first stage of our exercise should not 
prejudice our inference in stage two.5 We estimated variants of the following regression equation 
separately for six importing countries and 18 manufacturing sectors: 
tijij
ijtijijij
tijijtjti
tjtiijtij
uNTB
CLOSEDUMPTADUMLANGDUMBORDUM
LOGREMOTELOGDISTLOGPOPFLOGPOPH
LOGGDPFLOGGDPHHOMEDUMLOGIM
,12
11,1098
,76,5,4
,3,21,




	
				
				
			
  ,  (9) 
                                                 
5
 On the generality of the gravity equation, see Davis and Weinstein, 2001; Deardorff, 1998; Evenett and Keller, 
2001; Feenstra et al., 2001; Haveman and Hummels, 1997. The gravity model has been shown to be successful even 
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where the variable names have the following meanings (for details on the construction of these 
variables, see Appendix 2): 
LOGIMij,t = log of imports of country i from country j in year t, 
HOMEDUM = dummy which is 1 if i=j, and zero otherwise, 
LOGGDPH(F) = log of home-country (foreign-country) GDP, 
LOGPOPH(F) = log of home-country (foreign-country) population, 
LOGDIST = log of geographical distance between the two countries, 
LOGREMOTE = a measure of remoteness of i and j from the other sample countries, 
BORDUM = dummy which is 1 if i and j share a common border, and zero otherwise, 
LANGDUM = dummy which is 1 if i and j share a common language, and zero otherwise, 
PTADUM = dummy which is 1 if i and j are fellow members of a preferential trade 
agreement, 
CLOSEDDUM = dummy which is 1 if at least one of the two countries was described as 
“closed” by Sachs and Warner (1995), 
NTB = Harrigan (1993) measure of non-tariff import barriers by importer, exporter 
and industry in 1983. 
 
The object of our interest is 	1, the coefficient on trade within countries. A positive (negative) 
coefficient is interpreted as positive (negative) home bias. By including variables for distance, 
adjacency, language, PTAs and institutional obstacles to trade we aim to control for physical 
transport costs, tariff and non-tariff barriers as well as for informational and marketing costs in 
                                                                                                                                                             
at the level of individual industries inter alia by Bergstrand, 1990; Davis and Weinstein, 2001; Feenstra et al., 2000; 
Head and Mayer, 2000. 
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accessing foreign markets.6 To the extent that we manage to control for supply-side-driven cost 
differentials between domestic and foreign suppliers through inclusion of these variables, 
HOMEDUM will pick up the effect of home-biased demand. 
 
Another potentially important issue concerns the degree of substitutability of goods contained 
within an industry. As argued, among others, by Deardorff (1998) and demonstrated by Evans 
(2000), border effects depend not only on home biases and trade costs, but also on the elasticity 
of substitution among an industry’s products: border effects are higher if imports and domestic 
products are close substitutes in terms of their objective attributes, ceteris paribus. This issue is 
important for inter-industry comparisons. The main purpose of our home-bias estimates, 
however, is to allow for comparison across countries and over time, industry by industry, and 
hence our final exercise is unlikely to be affected by this concern. 
 
The practical difficulties in implementing this approach are twofold. First, one has to find a 
measure of “trade within countries”, and, second, the distance variable also has to be defined for 
intra-country trade. Following Wei (1996) and Helliwell (1997), we define trade within countries 
as output minus exports.7 The validity of this measure rests on the assumption that all output 
recorded in the statistics is sold in a different location from its place of production, i.e. neither 
consumed in situ nor used as an intermediate input in the original plant. The official definition of 
the “production boundary” in national accounts statistics supports us in making this assumption: 
“goods and services produced as outputs must be such that they can be sold on markets or at 
                                                 
6
 See Rauch (1999) on informational trade costs. Anderson and Marcouiller (2000) have shown that corruption and 
imperfect contract enforcement can act as additional impediments to international trade. It seems plausible that these 
effects will be less significant in our OECD-dominated country sample than in their data set, which included a large 
share of developing countries. 
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least be capable of being provided by one unit to another […]. The System [of national accounts] 
includes within the production boundary all production actually destined for the market” (OECD, 
1999).  
 
For estimates of “intra-country distances” we used the approach of Keeble, Offord and Walker 
(1986) and Leamer (1997), who defined them as equivalent to a fraction of the radius of a circle 
with the same area as the country in question: 
)1log(


i
ii
Area
x
LOGDIST  .        (10) 
 This method may appear crude, but Head and Mayer (2000) found it to produce strikingly 
similar results to a more sophisticated approach that could draw on regional data for the EU. The 
main weakness of this approach is its sensitivity to the choice of divisor x, which is arbitrary. For 
most of our analysis, we set x=3. As we will discuss below, however, this arbitrariness is of no 
consequence for our study, since our model requires a measure of relative, not absolute, home 
biases. 
 
Having constructed the intra-country variables, we estimated equation (9) on data for 18 
industrial sectors, six importing countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, UK), 
22 exporting countries (OECD members) and 16 years (1970-85), drawing mainly on the 
OECD’s COMTAP database as made available by Feenstra, Lipsey and Bowen (1997). This 
yielded a data set with close to 38,000 year- and industry-level bilateral observations. A full 
description of variables and data sources can be found in Appendix 2. 
  
                                                                                                                                                             
7
 Hence, LOGIMii,t = log(Output-Exports)ii,t. 
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We began by running several variants of equation (9) on the entire data set. These results are 
given in Table 2. First, we pooled the data and estimated the gravity equation using OLS, 
excluding the NTB variable (column (1) of Table 2). All coefficients have the expected signs and 
magnitudes and are statistically significant. A coefficient of 0.64 on HOMEDUM suggests that 
ceteris paribus a country’s trade with itself is on average 1.9 (=e0.64) times as large as trade with 
another country. This estimate may seem high. However, it fits at the lower end of the range 
found by Wei (1996) for aggregate trade among a smaller OECD sample, which lie between 1.3 
and 8.7, and it is smaller than the coefficient estimated by Helliwell (1997, Table 3) in his most 
comparable specifications.8 
 
In a second step, we re-ran the full equation (9) including the NTB variable. In principle, this 
should be regarded as a valuable control variable if the coefficient on HOMEDUM is to pick up 
home bias rather than cost differences between imports and domestic produce. However, due to 
incomplete coverage of the NTB data, inclusion of this regressor reduced the sample size by 
more than 40 percent.9 With the exception of foreign GDP, all coefficients remained statistically 
significant and correctly signed. Somewhat surprisingly, the coefficient on HOMEDUM 
increased to 1.54. This result, however, is due entirely to the sample selection forced through the 
inclusion of NTB; when we estimated specification (1) on those observations for which NTB was 
                                                 
8
 This figure might also seem at first sight to be incompatible with openness ratios (trade/GDP), which, in our data 
sample, range between 0.14 (US) and 0.90 (Belgium).  However, it must be borne in mind that this is a bilateral and 
conditional exercise. A coefficient on HOMEDUM of 0.64 suggests that, on average, a representative agent facing 
two potential trade partners, one domestic and one foreign, will be 1.9 times more likely to trade with the domestic 
partner, even after controlling for distance and other cost factors, but it does not mean that the average openness 
ratio should satisfy =(1-)/1.9=0.34. 
9
 The variable CLOSEDDUM had to be dropped in this specification, since the NTB variable is available for none of 
the countries for which CLOSEDDUM=1. 
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defined, the estimated coefficient on HOMEDUM was virtually identical. In other words, 
inclusion of the NTB variable limited the size of our data set but did not significantly affect the 
size of the estimated coefficient of interest. We therefore proceeded without including NTB. 
 
Our next step was to replace OLS by the Tobit estimator, to take account of the censoring in our 
data set due observations with zero trade (column (3) of Table 2). LOGIM is recorded as zero in 
1,574 observations (4%), whereof 86 are intra-country.10 This resulted in a slightly lower point 
estimate on HOMEDUM than OLS (0.54 vs. 0.64), which should not surprise, since zero 
observations account for a somewhat larger share of intra-country observations than of inter-
country observations. 
 
Wei (1996) has shown that the magnitude of the estimated home bias is sensitive to the way we 
proxy intra-national distances. We have therefore experimented with different definitions of 
LOGDISTii. LOGDIST1 (column (4) of Table 2) assumes intra-national distances to be 
equivalent to the full radius of a circle with the country’s surface area, that is LOGDIST1 
assumes larger average intra-national distances than the default LOGDIST, for which we set x=3. 
As a consequence, the estimated home bias increases to a factor 6.1 (=e1.81). The converse is true 
in the case of LOGDIST2, which assumes smaller average intra-national distances than 
LOGDIST, using a divisor x of 6 (column (5) of Table 2). With LOGDIST2, the estimated home-
bias factor turns negative, to –1.3 (=e-0.25). Obviously, one must be careful in interpreting the 
absolute magnitude of the home-bias estimates. Fortunately, this is not a problem in the context 
of our paper, since what we need in order to apply our discriminating criterion is an estimate of 
relative home biases, and these are unaffected by the definition of LOGDIST. 
 
                                                 
10
 We set intra-country trade to zero where exports exceeded production. 
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Imposing identical coefficients across the three dimensions of our panel is restrictive. Our paper 
builds on the presumption, that home biases differ across countries and sectors.11 Hence, our 
next step was to run equation (9) separately for each of the 108 country-industry observations (6 
importing countries times 18 industries), so as to obtain individual home-bias estimates. We used 
the same specification as that of model (3) in Table 2. The resulting coefficients on HOMEDUM, 
averaged by country, are reported in Table 3. On average, we find the strongest home biases for 
France and Germany, while the mean home bias for Italy is negative. As Table 3 shows, 
however, the mean home bias estimates hide large variances. This is borne out by Table 4, where 
we report the same estimation results, but averaged by industry. The highest average home 
biases are found in the sectors tobacco, meat, and other food; whilst the lowest average home 
biases appear in the sectors motor vehicles, timber and furniture, and paper and printing. These 
results appear to be quite plausible. They are the key ingredient to our testing equation, which we 
estimate in the second part of our empirical exercise. 
 
4.2 An Empirical Test of the Discriminating Criterion 
We estimated the following variant of equation (8) for each of the 18 industries s across the six 
importing countries i,j and four years t (1970, 75, 80, 85): 
s
it
s
it
ss
it
ss
it
sss
it uIDIOBIASIDIODEMSHAREOutput  321  ,   (11) 
where subscripts denote countries and years, superscripts denote industries, and: 
                                                 
11
 We also ran fixed-effects and random-effects panel models with year dummies to relax the restriction of identical 
intercepts across years, countries and sectors and found that the panel effects were significant and had non-
negligible effect on the estimated coefficient on HOMEDUM. These results are available from the authors on 
request. 
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According to our discriminating criterion, industries with estimated 3 of zero conform with the 
CRS-PC model, whereas industries with positive estimated 3 conform with the IRS-MC model. 
The other variables are constructed equivalently to the Davis-Weinstein testing equation. In our 
data set, IDIOBIAS and IDIODEM are not significantly correlated (see Appendix 2). 
 
Four issues warrant discussion. First, there is the question of sectoral disaggregation. Neither 
theory nor existing empirical work give us any strong priors as to the correct definition of an 
“industry” and constituent “goods” in the data (see Maskus, 1991). In our model, there is no 
hierarchy between “industries” and “goods”. As a consequence, factor endowments do not 
appear in the reduced-form testing equation (8). This is a result of the realistic assumption in our 
model that there are more goods than factors, and it is a convenient feature in view of empirical 
implementation, as it obviates the need to draw a dividing line between the two levels of sectoral 
aggregation.12 
 
                                                 
12
 Davis and Weinstein (2001b) found SHARE to be highly collinear with their endowment variables, and therefore 
dropped it from their testing specification. Since we are doing the reverse, omitted-variable bias is likely to be 
unimportant. 
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Second, there may exist potential for simultaneity of expenditure and output, and therefore bias 
in the estimates of 2. The use of input-output tables allows us to obviate to this problem. One 
source of simultaneity could arise from the use of the same data source in the construction of 
expenditure and output variables. If expenditure is constructed by subtracting net exports from 
output, measurement error will simultaneously affect dependent and independent variables, and 
thus bias estimated coefficients. This is why we draw our expenditure and output data from 
input-output tables. As pointed out by Trionfetti (2001), input-output tables should be immune 
from the simultaneity problem through measurement error, because output and expenditure data 
(horizontal and vertical entries) are collected from independent sources of raw data. In addition, 
simultaneity bias could arise if some sectoral expenditure represents demand for intermediate 
inputs that are classified under the same sector heading. Our testing equation (8) implies the 
assumption that expenditure shares are an exogenous determinant of output location, but this 
assumption is rarely satisfied in the data. It is for this reason that we have chosen to compute net 
expenditure per sector as well as gross expenditure, which is possible in input-output tables. The 
definition of “net expenditure” should include expenditure from those sources that use the 
industry’s output for final consumption, and exclude expenditure from those sources that use the 
output as intermediate inputs. Net expenditure is therefore computed as expenditure on the 
industry’s output by private households and by the public sector, excluding expenditure by the 
industry itself and by all other manufacturing industries.13 We call IDIODEM1 the variable 
computed from gross expenditure values and IDIODEM2 the variable computed from net 
expenditure values. 
                                                 
13
 Specifically, net expenditure is calculated as the sum of the following four expenditure headings in the input-
output tables (NACE-Clio R44 codes in brackets): “final consumption of households on the economic territory” 
(01), “general public services” (810), non-market services of education and research (850), and non-market services 
of health (890). 
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Third, situ is likely to be heteroskedastic, as the variance of errors may well be positively 
correlated with the size of countries.14 Our significance tests are therefore based on White-
corrected standard errors. We make this conservative adjustment in order to minimise the risk of 
wrongly attributing sectors to the IRS-MC paradigm due to underestimation of the standard error 
of 3. 
 
Fourth, IDIODEM is a generated regressor, which could lead to bias in the coefficient estimates 
on it and on all other explanatory variables (Pagan, 1980). No unbiased or consistent estimator 
has as yet been derived analytically for the situation where an estimated coefficient of one 
equation enters as an explanatory variable in another. We therefore resort to bootstrap 
techniques. Resampling the data 5,000 times with replication, we re-estimated the coefficient 
vectors and standard errors for each model. The difference between the original regression 
coefficients and their bootstrap equivalents is a measure of estimation bias. We followed Efron’s 
(1982) rule that bias is only a serious concern when the estimated bias is larger than 25 percent 
of the standard error. It turned out that the estimated biases were significantly below that 
threshold in all of the specifications that we estimated. Hence, we report the original coefficient 
estimates together with original as well as bootstrap estimated standard errors.15 
 
                                                 
14
 A Cook-Weisberg heteroskedasticity test on the pooled model strongly rejects the null of constant error variance. 
15
 One might think that the average estimated bootstrap coefficient is superior to the original regression estimate. 
However, the bootstrap coefficient estimates have an indeterminate amount of random error and may thus have 
greater mean square error than the (potentially biased) original regression estimates (Mooney and Duval, 1993). We 
therefore report the original regression estimates. 
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4.3 Results 
We first ran our model on the full data sample. The results are given in Table 5. In specification 
(1), we use OLS to estimate the specification based on gross expenditure values (IDIODEM1). 
This yields a coefficient on IDIOBIAS that is positive but not significantly different from zero, 
hence we would infer that on the whole the CRS-PC model dominates the IRS-MC model. In 
specification (2) we re-ran the same equation with IDIODEM2, which is based on net 
expenditure values. We find that the coefficient on IDIODEM2 is significantly smaller than 
IDIODEM1, the two coefficients being 0.60 and 1.17 respectively. This is confirms that the 
coefficient on demand idiosyncrasies is biased upward if demand is measured in gross terms. We 
also find that the estimated coefficient on IDIOBIAS is larger in the second specification and has 
become statistically significantly different from zero. This suggests that, on average, the IRS-MC 
model has stronger explanatory power than the CRS-PC model. Specifications (3) and (4), where 
we account for observed heteroskedasticity across sectors and countries by estimating a panel 
GLS model, confirm this result: the coefficient on IDIOBIAS, corresponding to c2 of our testing 
equation (8) is always statistically significantly positive. 
 
We know a priori that pooled runs impose too much structure, since our motivating hypothesis is 
to find different parameter estimates for individual industries. The results of industry-by-industry 
regressions are given in Table 6. The equation generally performs well, yielding R2s in the range 
0.56 to 0.99. Coefficient estimates on IDIOBIAS are in the expected positive or insignificant 
range for all industries.  
 
At the 95-percent confidence level we find that, of the 18 industries, five conform with the IRS-
MC paradigm. The allocation of sectors looks broadly plausible. 
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It is interesting to measure the relative importance of the two paradigms in terms of their share of 
industrial output (Table 6, columns 5/6). According to our results based on the six largest EU 
economies, IRS-MC sectors account for around one quarter of industrial production. This share 
was increasing over our sample period. The combined output share of the five IRS sectors in our 
data set was 24.7 percent in 1970 and 26.7 percent in 1985. 
  
A final comment is in order. Our estimates of the parameter 2 are consistent with those of Davis 
and Weinstein (1996), namely, we do not find evidence of the magnification effect. Our 
interpretation is different however. We do not interpret the absence of magnification effects as 
validation of the CRS-PC paradigm, because, as discussed in the theory section, 2 may be 
smaller than one in both CRS-PC and IRS-MC sectors when demand is home biased. According 
to our model, 2 will take positive values, and will reflect important trade costs if it is 
significantly larger than zero. Our results are consistent with this prediction. The estimated 
coefficients on IDIODEM are never significantly negative, but they are significantly positive in 
ten of our 18 sectors. This is another indication that the empirical testing equation, which is tied 
closely to the underlying theoretical model, performs well in our data set. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
We have developed and applied an empirical test to separate two paradigms of international 
trade theory: a model with constant returns and perfect competition (CRS-PC), and a model with 
increasing returns a monopolistic competition (IRS-MC). The discriminating criterion makes use 
of the assumption that demand is home biased, an assumption that is strongly supported in the 
empirical literature. We show theoretically that specialisation patterns are affected by inter-
country differences in the degree of home bias if an industry conforms to the IRS-MC paradigm, 
but not if it is characterised by CRS-PC. This result provides us with a discriminating criterion 
that we implement empirically. In the empirical part we estimate industry- and country-level 
home biases through disaggregated gravity regressions, and use these estimates to apply our test 
to a data set with 18 industries for the six major EU countries in 1970-85. The results suggest 
that five industries, accounting for around a quarter of industrial output, can be associated with 
IRS-MC. 
 
In addition to the assumption that demand is home biased, our study distinguishes itself from the 
literature on home-market effects in two principal ways. One feature is that the discriminating 
criterion holds regardless of whether trade costs exist, and regardless of whether they exist only 
in the IRS-MC sector or in both. This is a welcome feature especially in the light of the 
sensitivity, highlighted in the recent literature, of the magnification effect to the way trade costs 
appear in the model. Another innovation is that, in the empirical part, we draw on input-output 
data. This allows us to relate production to final expenditure, and hence to avoid simultaneity 
problems that might arise from regressing production on total expenditure where there are intra-
sectoral input-output linkages. 
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TABLE 1: Interpretation of Parameter Values in the Testing Equation 
 
c1 c2 Paradigm Trade costs 
+ + IRS-MC  < 1 
0 + IRS-MC  = 1 
+ 0 CRS-PC  < 1 
0 0 CRS-PC  = 1 
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TABLE 2: Gravity Equations: Full Sample 
(6 importing countries, 22 exporting countries, 18 sectors, 1970-85: dependent variable = log of 
imports; beta coefficients in brackets) 
 
 OLS Tobit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
HOMEDUM 0.64 
(0.04) 
1.54 
(0.13) 
0.54 
(0.04) 
1.81 
(0.12) 
-0.25 
(-0.02) 
LOGGDPH 1.33 
(0.16) 
2.78 
(0.35) 
1.33 
(0.18) 
1.33 
(0.18) 
1.33 
(0.18) 
LOGGDPF 1.63 
(0.26) 
-0.09# 
(-0.01) 
1.63 
(0.30) 
1.63 
(0.30) 
1.63 
(0.30) 
LOGPOPH 0.68 
(0.14) 
0.72 
(0.17) 
0.70 
(0.17) 
0.70 
(0.17) 
0.70 
(0.17) 
LOGPOPF 0.56 
(0.17) 
0.28 
(0.10) 
0.57 
(0.20) 
0.57 
(0.20) 
0.57 
(0.20) 
LOGDIST -1.14 
(-0.43) 
-0.69 
(-0.33) 
-1.15 
(-0.49) 
 
 
 
LOGDIST1    -1.15 
(-0.45) 
 
LOGDIST2     -1.15 
(-0.52) 
LOGREMOTE 0.04 
(0.25) 
0.04 
(0.27) 
0.04 
(0.27) 
0.04 
(0.27) 
0.04 
(0.27) 
BORDUM 0.32 
(0.04) 
0.38 
(0.05) 
0.31 
(0.04) 
0.31 
(0.04) 
0.31 
(0.04) 
LANGDUM 0.93 
(0.09) 
0.62 
(0.07) 
0.97 
(0.10) 
0.97 
(0.10) 
0.97 
(0.10) 
PTADUM 0.72 
(0.10) 
0.99 
(0.15) 
0.72 
(0.11) 
0.72 
(0.11) 
0.72 
(0.11) 
CLOSEDDUM -1.29 
(-0.12) 
 -1.39 
(-0.15) 
-1.39 
(-0.15) 
-1.39 
(-0.15) 
NTB  -2.53 
(-0.21) 
   
No. of observations 37,968 22,176 37,968 37,968 37,968 
No. of censored obs. n.a. n.a. 1,526 1,526 1,526 
R2 0.44 0.42 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Note: All coefficients pass the t test at the 0.01% level, except that marked by #. 
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TABLE 3: Estimated Home-Country Biases by Country, 1970-85 
 
Country Mean coefficient on 
HOMEDUM 
Standard deviation of 
coefficients on HOMEDUM 
Belgium-Luxembourg 0.50 2.24 
France 4.34 2.82 
West Germany 3.29 1.45 
Italy -0.79 1.16 
Netherlands 1.11 2.90 
United Kingdom 2.84 1.22 
Note: Based on Tobit regression (specification (3) of Table 2) estimated separately for each of 
the 6 importing countries and 18 sample industries. 
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TABLE 4: Estimated Home-Country Biases by NACE Industry, 1970-85 
 
NACE code: Industry Mean coefficient on 
HOMEDUM 
Standard deviation of 
coefficients on HOMEDUM 
1170: Chemicals 2.21 2.22 
1190: Metal goods 1.15 1.39 
1210: Machinery 1.69 1.36 
1230: Office machines 0.71 4.22 
1250: Electrical goods 1.90 2.14 
1270: Motor vehicles 
-0.21 3.59 
1290: Other transp. eq. 1.94 1.54 
1310: Meat products 3.50 3.35 
1330: Dairy products 2.70 2.43 
1350: Other food 3.45 1.92 
1370: Beverages 2.26 2.97 
1390: Tobacco products 4.76 4.70 
1410: Textiles, clothing 2.18 3.15 
1430: Leather, footwear 1.84 2.64 
1450: Timber, furniture 0.39 1.60 
1470: Pulp, paper, printing 0.41 1.25 
1490: Rubber, plastic 1.63 1.99 
1510: Instrum. engineering 
           and other manuf. 
2.29 2.28 
Note: Based on Tobit regression (specification (3) of Table 2) estimated separately for each of 
the 6 importing countries and 18 sample industries. 
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Appendix 1: Theoretical Extensions 
 
A1.1 No Magnification Effect in IRS-MC Sectors When Demand is Home Biased 
 
We can show that the derivative  dd /  is not necessarily larger than one when demand is home 
biased. Let us define the left-hand side of (7) as a   ,,,, 21 hhP . Unfortunately, in general, the 
roots of this polynomial are long expression that are not manageable (even for the computer) 
except in the following two cases.  
 
Case A: Identical Countries 
Setting 1  and hhh  21  the only positive root of the polynomial is 1 . Differentiating 
totally around this root gives: 
    
    
     
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/.
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22
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This derivative, although it is larger than one, i.e. it exhibits the magnification effect, is always 
smaller than the derivative under the benchmark case, which is: 
    
 
  11
1
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Hence, home-biased demand attenuates the size of the magnification effect. 
 
Case B: Non-Identical Countries 
In this example we drop the assumption of identical countries by assuming that only country 2 is 
home biased (i.e., 01 h ) so that the polynomial   ,,,, 21 hhP  reduces to a second-degree 
polynomial. Differentiating around its only positive root gives:  
        	    
    	21222222
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This expression is not particularly informative. Yet, after assigning specific values to one of the 
three parameters, the expression can be plotted in a three-dimensional space. An example is in 
Figure A1, where the expression for  2,, hd
d



 is compared with the constant 1. The figure 
(computed at 1 ) shows a large domain in which   1,1, 2 
hd
d



, i.e., no magnification effect 
exists.  Many other combinations of parameter values also yield no magnification effect. 
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Figure A1.1: An Example of the Domain with No Magnification Effect 
 
 
 
A1.2 Home Bias in the CES Aggregate 
 
The home bias may be modelled in the utility function also at the CES sub-utility level, for 
instance in the following way. 
   
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where the weights  and  represent the bias. Then, defining iiih  / , the market equilibrium 
equations (compacted into one) for the IRS-MC product becomes 
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and the derivative is 
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which is not necessarily larger than one, even at 1 . Hence, the magnification effect cannot 
serve as a robust discrimination criterion here either. 
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A1.3.  Trade Costs in the CRS-PC Sector 
 
In this section we show that home-biased demand is irrelevant for international specialisation in 
the CRS-PC sector even if these goods are traded at a transport cost. Introducing trade costs in 
the homogeneous goods results in the non-equalisation of factor prices. The major consequence 
for our paper is that we cannot derive equation (7) and the expression for dhd /  as neatly as we 
do under factor price equalisation. This notwithstanding, we can show the irrelevance of the 
home bias in CRS-PC sectors by inspection of the market equilibrium equations. For clarity of 
exposition we consider the situation where, say, country 1 is a net exporter of Y. Naturally, the 
choice of the country is irrelevant. Assume that for each unit of Y shipped, only a fraction 
 1,0  arrives at destination. Then, equation (6) becomes 
  	   	 22112222211111 11 YpYpEhEhpEhEhp YYYYYYYYYYYY    
Once again, hYi cancels out of this expression. This means that the home bias is irrelevant for 
international specialisation in the CRS-PC sector and, therefore, that the assumption of free trade 
in Y and Z made in Section 3 is purely a matter of analytical convenience. 
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Appendix 2:  Data Description 
 
Output data are taken from input-output tables in Eurostat’s “National Accounts ESA” series. 
Bilateral trade data are taken from the World Trade Database, available through Feenstra et al. 
(1997). We retained trade data recorded by the importing countries. These data, original 
classified under SITC headings, were concorded with the NACE input-output data used for the 
output values. Hence, all trade flows are c.i.f., and our estimates of trade within countries can be 
considered conservative. Observations for which estimated intra-country trade was, implausibly, 
negative (i.e. Output-Exports<0) were set to zero. 
 
The following 22 exporting countries are contained in our sample: Australia, Austria, Belgium-
Luxembourg, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, UK, USA, Yugoslavia. A 
list of the 18 NACE industries in our data set can be found in Table 6. Distance data measure 
great circle distances between the countries’ capital cities. They are from Jon Haveman 
(www.macalester.edu/research/economics/PAGE/HAVEMAN/Trade.Resources/TradeData.html). 
 
Inclusion of a remoteness variable in the gravity model has been advocated persuasively by 
Polak (1996). LOGREMOTE is defined as follows (in the spirit of Helliwell, 1997): 
]2[
,
,,    jik tkjkiktij LOGGDPLOGDISTLOGDISTLOGREMOTE . 
 
The linguistic groupings underlying LANGDUM are defined as follows: 
English: Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, UK, USA; French: Belgium, Canada, France; 
German: Austria, Germany; Dutch: Belgium, Netherlands; Scandinavian: Denmark, Sweden, 
Norway. 
 
The preferential trade areas underlying PTADUM are defined as follows: 
EU: Belgium, Denmark (1973-), Greece (1981-), France, Germany, Ireland (1973-), Italy, UK 
(1973-). 
EFTA: Austria, Denmark (-1972), Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK (-1972). 
Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement: Australia, New Zealand. 
 
The dummy for trade “closedness” is from Sachs and Warner (1995). The dummy is set to zero 
if a country satisfies four tests: (1) average tariff rates below 40 percent; (2) average quota and 
licensing coverage of imports of less than 40 percent; (3) a black market exchange rate premium 
that averaged less than 20 percent during the 1970s and 1980s; and (4) no extreme controls 
(taxes, quotas, state monopolies) on exports. It turns out that this measure is time invariant in our 
data set. According to the Sachs-Warner criteria, New Zealand, Turkey and Yugoslavia were 
“closed” for the whole time interval 1970-85, whilst the remaining 19 countries were “open” 
throughout this period. 
 
Correlations among the variables of our testing equation (underlying Table 4, 9816 obs.): 
 
 Output SHARE IDIODEM IDIOBIAS 
Output 1.000    
SHARE 0.624 1.000   
IDIODEM 0.219 -0.002 1.000  
IDIOBIAS 0.287 0.364 -0.049 1.000 
 
